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PERPETUATION OF PAST DISCRIMINATION
Eric Schnapper*
The evil men do lives after them,
The good is oft interred with their bones.'
F OR a century 2 the Supreme Court has grappled with de-
termining the constitutionality of several different kinds of
conduct, all of which it has loosely described as "perpetuation
of past discrimination." 3 The frequency with which this sub-
ject has arisen indicates its practical importance to the elimi-
nation of racial discrimination; that it has been discussed more
often in recent decades reflects both the increased sensitivity
of the federal judiciary to the enduring effects of past discrim-
ination and the multitude of harms that those effects have
caused. Members of the Court have conflicting views about
the meaning of its past decisions 4 and have not agreed upon
the legal consequences of perpetuation of past discrimination
* Assistant Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. Lecturer
in Law, Columbia University. Johns Hopkins University, B.A., 1962; M.A., 1963;
Oxford University, B. Phil., 1965; Yale University, LL.B., x968.
1 W. SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act H1, scene ii, lines 8o-8i.
2 See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 475-78 (1980); City of Rome v.
United States, 446 U.S. i56, 176-77 (i98o); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 347-49 (I977); Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451,
471 (2972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 221 n.6
(i971); id. at 231, 237, 239 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22 (i97I); Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285,
296-97 (1969); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (2968); Griffin v.
County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 232 (1964); Strauder y. West Va., oo U.S. 3o3,
306 (i88o).
3 Although this Article explicitly treats only perpetuation of past racial discrimi-
nation, it is generally applicable to perpetuation of other prohibited forms of discrim-
ination as well. The historical and legal backgrounds of these prohibitions are dif-
ferent, but the constitutional guarantee in each case seeks to prevent the continuation
of past abuses, and violations of these guarantees have had enduring impacts.
4 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (noting that, contrary
to the Court's holding, "[t]here are some indications" that discriminatory intent is not
required in demonstrating an equal protection violation); Palmer v. Thompson, 403
U.S. 217, 221-23 (1971) (discussing the meaning of Griffin v. County School Bd., 377
U.S. 218 (I964)). Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (2964), condemned the
closing of the Prince Edward County schools and other, related measures, on the
ground that these actions perpetuated segregation. Five members of the Court in
Palmer insisted that the existence of an intent to perpetuate segregation was irrelevant
to the decision in Griffin. See 403 U.S. at 228-3o. Justice White, on the other hand,
thought that discriminatory motive was the critical factor. See id. at 241-43 (White,
J., dissenting). Five years after Palmer, the three Justices from the Palmer majority
who remained on the Court concluded that an intent to discriminate is a necessary
element in an equal protection claim. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 238-48.
828
PERPETUATION OF DISCRIMINATION
in even the most frequently discussed circumstances.5 The
Court has not attempted to develop a coherent explanation of
this area of the law or even to distinguish among the very
different meanings of the term "perpetuation." Scholars like-
wise are divided over whether perpetuation is always uncon-
stitutional, 6 never unconstitutional, 7 or forbidden in some but
not all cases.8
The phrase "perpetuation of racial discrimination" is used
in three different senses, the first two of which this Article
does not discuss in detail. "Perpetuation of past discrimina-
tion" can refer to situations in which a state, acting out of
racial malice, seeks to continue or revive the harms or practices
created by earlier intentional discrimination. Such intentional
perpetuation is an obvious violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 9 In resolving a claim of this type of perpetuation, a
s The use of literacy tests by a state that had previously provided blacks an inferior
education is discussed in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (197),
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 131-34 (197o), and Gaston County v. United
States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
6 See Brest, The Supreme Court, z975 Term - Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REV. I, 31-36 (1976); Perry, The Dispro-
portionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 540, 557-58
(1977).
7 See Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107,
144-45 (1976) ("important source of appeal of antidiscrimination principle is lost"
when perpetuation is banned). But see id. at 157 (equal protection clause prohibits
perpetuation by state action).
8 See Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Consti-
tutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36 (1977). The standards suggested by
Eisenberg differ in most respects from those advanced in this Article. First, Eisenberg
draws no distinctions based on whether the original discriminatory act was official or
private or on how that act was related to the injury, see, e.g., id. at 59 (discussing
refusal of private establishment to serve blacks); this Article argues that such differ-
ences are of great importance, see infra Part IE. Second, Eisenberg insists that, in
order to be actionable, a present harm must not only be proximately caused by the
past discrimination, but must also be "reasonably attributable" to it, Eisenberg, supra,
at 40, 55, 6o; this Article recognizes no such limitation. Third, Eisenberg urges that
the defense available to the state depends on the type of injury suffered by the victim,
Eisenberg, supra, at 68-73; this Article suggests that the defense depends, instead, on
the nature of the causal relationship between the injury and the initial act of discrim-
ination, see infra pp. 859-62. Fourth, unlike this Article, see infra p. 86i, Eisenberg
maintains that harm attributable to past discrimination is unconstitutional only if that
discrimination has a disparate impact on blacks as a group. Eisenberg, supra, at 64.
9 For example, when the federal courts ordered the desegregation of the Prince
Edward County schools in Virginia, the county supervisors closed the schools and
offered tuition grants and property tax credits to support the segregated private schools
that the white students attended. See Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218,
223-24 (1964). The Supreme Court condemned this scheme because it was "created
to accomplish . .. the perpetuation of racial segregation by closing public schools
and operating only segregated schools supported directly or indirectly by state or
1983]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
similarity between the old forms of discrimination and the new
practices whose purposes are in dispute would be substantial
evidence of an illicit motive. 10
In a second and very different sense, "perpetuation of past
discrimination" can be used to describe the occurrence of cir-
cumstances that involve no present intent to perpetuate and
no causal connection with any earlier discrimination, but that
coincidentally resemble an earlier state of affairs that was the
result of discrimination." For example, in a school system
that was once segregated de jure and subsequently integrated
by a student assignment plan, population shifts could re-create
all-white and all-black schools. Unlike intentional perpetua-
tion of discrimination, such recurrent perpetuation does not
violate the Constitution. 12 As long as the present situation is
not the result of any prior intentional discrimination or of any
present discriminatory purpose, the mere resemblance of cur-
rent harms to some previous unconstitutionally motivated
wrongs is not by itself of more than historical interest. 13
Finally, "perpetuation of past discrimination" can be used
to describe present harms to minorities that are caused by past
intentional discrimination but involve no present government
discriminatory intent. The critical question regarding such
causal perpetuation is whether, and (if so) when, 14 a present
county funds." Id. at 232. In such cases of intentional perpetuation, there may be
no direct causal connection between the old and new forms of discrimination. Thus,
in Griffin the segregated private school system resulted from the school closings,
governmental financial assistance, and the racist attitudes of white parents - only
the last having in any way been caused by the earlier school segregation. In general,
a claim of intentional perpetuation raises essentially the same legal and factual issues
posed by other claims of intentional discrimination.
10
Evidence of historical discrimination is relevant to drawing an inference of
purposeful discrimination, particularly in cases . . . where the evidence shows
that discriminatory practices were commonly utilized, that they were aban-
doned when enjoined by courts or made illegal by civil rights legislation, and
that they were replaced by laws and practices which, though neutral on their
face, serve to maintain the status quo.
Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3280 (1982); see also The Supreme Court, i98z
Term, 96 HARv. L. REv. 62, ioS-io (1982) (suggesting that Rogers v. Lodge indicates
a greater -willingness on the part of the Court to consider historical evidence of
discrimination in adjudicating equal protection claims).
11 See Fiss, supra note 7, at 157 (using term in this sense).
12 See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434-37 (,976).
13 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
14 Thus, Professor Fiss correctly argues that it would violate traditional standards
of accountability and causation to recognize a cause of action for continuing harms
suffered by blacks if the sole basis for that recognition is that blacks were "slaves for
one century and subject to Jim Crow laws for another." See Fiss, supra note 7, at
145. The difficulty recognized by Professor Fiss is that, although present harms are
[Vol. 96:828
PERPETUATION OF DISCRIMINATION
harm is so related to some past discrimination that it violates
the Constitution. Part I of this Article offers several justifi-
cations for providing remedies for present harms that are
caused by past acts of discrimination. Part II describes the
different ways in which past discrimination can cause a present
injury, and suggests for each way the appropriate legal stan-
dard for deciding when there is a present constitutional vio-
lation. Part HI discusses the problems likely to arise in ad-
ministering the suggested standards, and concludes that these
problems are not inherently different from those involved in
ordinary discrimination cases.
I. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE PERPETUATION DOCTRINE
Three distinct but interrelated considerations support the
conclusion that the Constitution prohibits the causal perpetua-
tion of past discrimination. The framers of the fourteenth
amendment intended to prevent the perpetuation of the system
of social injustice over which the Civil War had been fought.
Today, as was true a century ago, remedying injuries caused
by earlier discrimination is essential to prevent the achieve-
ment of the racist goals that underlie such invidious acts.
Finally, perpetuation of past discrimination is sufficiently sim-
ilar to, if not indistinguishable from, simple discrimination that
the two forms of discrimination ought to receive the same legal
treatment. 15
A. The Framers' Intent
The perpetuation of past discrimination was central among
the problems that the fourteenth amendment was framed to
eliminate. 16 The amendment was adopted, like the 1866 Civil
in fact caused by centuries of discrimination, it is impossible to discern over the course
of 200 years what factors caused a particular individual to be unemployed in 1983.
Is The correct constitutional analysis of a complex discriminatory transaction must
be based on the purpose of the 14 th amendment and the nature of the abuses that
the amendment was designed to eliminate. The purpose of the I 4 th amendment
should also determine whether the passage of time between a discriminatory act and
a resulting injury is to be deemed irrelevant, or whether such a time period removes
from constitutional scrutiny conduct that causes harms long after the discriminatory
purpose. The answers to questions about proximate cause, statutes of limitations, or
equitable remedies will delineate the wrongs that the 14th amendment will in reality
redress, and those questions are thus fundamentally constitutional in nature.
16 The slavery controversy that preoccupied the nation for its first century may be
seen as a contest between "those who desired [slavery's] curtailment and ultimate
extinction and those who desired additional safeguards for its security and perpetua-
tion." Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (i6 Wall.) 36, 68 (I872). It was a tour de
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Rights Act, 1 7 on which it was based, largely in response to the
black codes enacted by the southern states after the Civil
War.' 8 Congress was particularly concerned with the labor
regulations contained in the black codes. The provisions to
which Congress most repeatedly objected were the vagrancy
laws;19 these laws defined "vagrant" in a way that included
virtually any adult who was not gainfully employed, and pro-
vided that anyone convicted of vagrancy would be punished
by up to one year of forced labor in the service of some private
individual. 20 Congress was also concerned with statutes that
made it a crime to induce an employee to leave his or her
present employer 2' and that authorized forfeiture of all wages
if a worker failed to complete the terms of his or her contract. 22
All of these provisions tended to "lock" former slaves into the
service of their old masters. Although most of these regula-
tions were facially neutral, 23 Congress knew that the burdens
of these regulations would fall almost exclusively on the newly
force of perpetuation that, five years before the Civil War began, underlay the decision
in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 6o U.S. (i 9 How.) 393 (I856), which, over the objection
of the abolitionists, facilitated the spread of the enforcement of slavery. Public opinion
and state legislation, the Court concluded, "show[ed] that a perpetual and impassable
barrier was intended to be erected between the white race and the one which they
had reduced to slavery." Id. at 409. Dred Scott held that blacks could not be made
citizens of the United States in I856, because the widespread discrimination against
blacks in 1789 demonstrated that the framers of the Constitution intended permanently
to exclude blacks from the benefits of American citizenship. The Dred Scott decision
was condemned during the debates on the i4 th amendment. See CONG. GLOBE, 3 9th
Cong., ist Sess. 1285 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Creswell); id. at 118i (remarks of Sen.
Pomeroy).
17 Civil Rights Act of i866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
18 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 21-22 (2883); Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70 (1872) (discussing purpose of the i4 th amendment); see Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 432-33 (1968); id. at 458, 467 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (discussing purpose of the Civil Rights Act of i866).
19 See CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., ist Sess. 116o (1866) (remarks of Rep. Windom);
id. at 115I (remarks of Rep. Thayer); id. at 1123-24 (remarks of Rep. Cook); id. at
504 (remarks of Sen. Howard).
20 See E. MCPHERSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION 30 (1871) (Mississippi); id. at
33 (Georgia); id. at 39 (Florida); id. at 41 (Virginia); id. at 41-42 (Louisiana).
21 1 W. FLEMING, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 287-89 (1906-
07) (Mississippi); id. at 304 (South Carolina); E. MCPHERSON, supra note 2o, at 31
(Mississippi); id. at 34 (Alabama); id. at 39 (Florida); id. at 43 (Louisiana).
22 See, e.g., I W. FLEMING, supra note 21, at 301 (South Carolina).
23 Vagrancy laws applied without regard to race in Georgia, Florida, Virginia,
and Louisiana. Portions of the Mississippi vagrancy law were limited to blacks. The
employment regulations in South Carolina, Alabama, and Louisiana applied to all
laborers, but the statutes in Mississippi and Florida applied only to blacks. See
sources cited supra note 21.
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freed slaves because of the social and economic disadvantages
that existed as a result of a lifetime of involuntary servitude. 24
In approving the fourteenth amendment, Congress con-
demned the black codes not simply as unjust, but also as a
device that would continue the social and economic wrongs
over which the Civil War had been fought and that the thir-
teenth amendment had been adopted to end. Representative
Cook of Illinois argued that "under other names and in other
forms a system of involuntary servitude might be perpetuated
over this unfortunate race."' 25 Representative Thayer of Penn-
sylvania felt that the codes would "retain [freedmen] in a state
of real servitude."' 26 Many feared that, unless constrained, the
former Confederate states would make "the legal status of...
slaves and their posterity even worse than before."' 27 Propo-
nents of the fourteenth amendment pointed to the similarities
between the disabilities imposed by the black codes and those
created by the old slave codes, and argued that the latter were
"in substance still in force."' 28 Deeply concerned with the
danger that the unrepentant former rebel states would re-create
the same injustices that the Civil War had been waged to end,
Congress passed the fourteenth amendment in the hope of
"securing and perpetuating the victories of the battle-field. '"29
The post-Reconstruction reaction feared by the thirty-ninth
Congress in fact occurred. With the acquiescence of an indif-
ferent federal judiciary and a politically immobilized federal
legislature and executive branch, a system of laws, customs,
and practices was erected that continued - to the extent
consistent with the changing needs of the South - the eco-
nomic and social subjugation of blacks that had existed before
the Civil War.30 After Brown v. Board of Education31 sparked
a revival of the effort to end racial oppression, racism became
a struggle to continue the old but formally condemned Jim
24 See infra p. 835.
25 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1124 (I866) (remarks of Rep. Cook)
(emphasis added).
26 Id. at I 5i (remarks of Rep. Thayer) (emphasis added).
27 Id. at 1182 (remarks of Sen. Pomeroy); see also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(i6 Wall.) 36, 70 (1866) (under the black codes, "the condition of the slave race would
... be almost as bad as it was before").
28 CONG. GLOBE, 3 9th Cong., ist Sess. 740 (i866) (remarks of Sen. Lane); see id.
at Ix81 (remarks of Sen. Pomeroy); id. at 833 (remarks of Sen. Clark); see also Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441-42 (x968) (black codes were "substitutes
for the slave system").
29 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1181 (I866) (remarks of Sen. Pomeroy).
30 See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 51--83 (1975); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE
STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1957).
3' 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Crow system. As Justice Douglas observed after reviewing
decades of Supreme Court decisions striking down discrimi-
nation in public schools, colleges, housing, public accommo-
dations, trains, buses, beaches, parks, and libraries, the
"[c]ases which have come to [the] Court depict a spectacle of
slavery unwilling to die."' 32 Today, as was true a century ago,
these diverse forms of discrimination are not isolated or spon-
taneous wrongs, but "badges," "incidents," and "relics" of the
slavery whose trappings such discrimination still seeks to per-
petuate. 33
B. Perpetuation and the Nature of Discrimination
The central purpose of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment is to prevent official conduct that dis-
criminates on the basis of race and to protect minorities from
injuries caused by invidious motives. Regardless whether
those who caused an alleged injury acted recently and nearby
or long ago and far away, if they acted for discriminatory
purposes effective deterrence and full redress require that the
resulting injury be remedied. Washington v. Davis34 does not
require that injury and motive be contemporaneous, but only
that the injury result from or be "ultimately . . . traced to a
racially discriminatory purpose."'35
Although American society has gradually moved away from
the more blatant forms of racial injustice, the racist cause has
generally sought to preserve or revive the abuses of the past
and ensure their propagation into the future. Historically,
discrimination that is aimed at subjugating a particular group
has focused on causing harms of lasting impact. If, in a
discriminatory society, all blacks daily sought the same eco-
nomic, social, and political status that whites possessed, that
society would face an intolerable level of unrest as well as an
administrative burden well beyond its capabilities to bear.
Neither Jim Crow nor apartheid could long exist if it were
necessary to impose restraints and punishments daily on each
member of the victimized group. Sustained discrimination re-
quires the existence of devices, institutions, and circumstances
that impose burdens or constraints on the target group without
resort to repeated or individualized discriminatory actions.
Only if one racist decision can affect large numbers of victims
32 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 445 (1968) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring).
33 See id. at 439, 443; The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
34 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
3S Id. at 240.
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over an extended period of time is discrimination administra-
tively feasible.
For sound practical reasons, therefore, discriminatory so-
cieties have adopted forms of discrimination that have endur-
ing impacts. For example, denying blacks education and
skilled employment was central to the success of racism in the
old South. If a young black lacked skills and training, the
odds were excellent that he or she would be employable only
as a laborer or maid. But if blacks went to college, keeping
them "in their place" was likely to be a continuing problem.
Brown v. Board of Education36 condemned segregated schools
because they engendered a feeling of inferiority "in a way
unlikely ever to be undone" 37 and because a child denied the
opportunity of an education could not "reasonably be expected
to succeed in life."' 38 These long-term effects of discrimination
in education were the very reason that the South considered
such discrimination vital to the preservation of Jim Crow. 39
Perpetuation is thus central not only to the purpose of discrim-
ination, but also to the means by which discrimination is
achieved.
Although changing conditions and increasing federal inter-
vention have required alterations in the methods of discrimi-
nation, in many instances it has been sufficient merely to
"freeze" 40 the status quo in order to achieve a discriminatory
effect. At the end of Reconstruction, for example, it was
necessary to remove hundreds of thousands of blacks from the
rolls of registered voters in order to achieve white political
supremacy; by I960, however, that goal could be realized in
many regions of the country simply by keeping the rolls all-
white.4 1
Moreover, the nature of today's complex industrialized so-
ciety facilitates such far-reaching discrimination. A discrimi-
natory act occurs in a world generally organized to amplify
and extend the impact of official and private action. In order
to achieve legitimate goals, modern economic, governmental,
36 347 U.S. 484 (1954).
37 Id. at 493.
33 Id. at 494.
39 Compared to these forms of discrimination, random racial violence by the police
was often relatively pointless. Thus, although southern society emphasized relegating
black children to separate and unequal schools, its attitude toward police violence did
not ordinarily exceed benign tolerance. See C. VANN WOODWARD, supra note 30, at
x5-26.
40 See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176 (198o); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
334 (1966).
41 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 310-14.
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and other institutions must establish rules and procedures for
carrying the effects of a particular decision into the future and
into the lives of large numbers of individuals. Such a network
of practices can greatly extend the impact of a single discrim-
inatory decision. Rather than interview and screen large num-
bers of job applicants with widely varying backgrounds and
skills, for example, employers frequently rely on the decisions
of public or private employment agencies; if such an agency
for discriminatory reasons classified a trained carpenter as an
unskilled laborer, that decision would bar the craftsman from
a large number of possible positions.
Administrative convenience is not the only basis for the
selection of discriminatory acts with enduring impact. Any
governmental official of the last several decades would cer-
tainly know that repeated, overtly discriminatory acts are sub-
ject to legal challenge and run a high risk of failure. A
"rational" segregationist school board thus would choose (for
purportedly nonracial reasons) to build schools in the centers
of black and white neighborhoods 42 and thereafter to assign
students to their "neighborhood schools," rather than build
schools on the borders of those neighborhoods and assign stu-
dents each year on the basis of race. The probable effect on
race relations is also likely to incline racist officials to favor
the discriminatory actions with the enduring effects that would
obviate the need for continued overtly discriminatory conduct.
Even before the civil rights movement, the need to avoid
provoking black unrest and the desire to maintain a certain
measure of civility in the midst of a deeply racist society
counseled against unnecessary overtness. To the extent, now
substantial, that blacks possess political power, white officials
have even greater reason to prefer forms of discrimination with
long-term and pervasive effects.
C. Perpetuation and Discrimination
In the most familiar cases of intentional discrimination, the
individual with the discriminatory intent and the individual
who actually inflicts the harm on the victim are the same
person. This form of discriminatory action occurs, for exam-
ple, when a city personnel officer, motivated by racial animus,
rejects a fully qualified black applicant for a job. In a complex
society, however, decisions are frequently made in a variety
of other ways:
42 See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 462 & n.iI (1979).
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(i) A personnel officer rejects a black applicant, who is
capable of doing the work involved, because the applicant
lacks a high school degree - the high school degree require-
ment having been adopted by other city officials to exclude
qualified blacks. 43
(2) A personnel officer rejects a black applicant because of
the applicant's low score on a written examination - the score
having resulted from past discrimination in the public schools
attended by the applicant. 44
(3) A personnel officer rejects a black applicant because
another officer gave the applicant a low rating based on an
interview with the applicant - the low rating having resulted
not from any lack of qualification, but because the interview-
ing officer wanted to prevent the hiring of blacks. 45
(4) A personnel officer refuses to consider a black applicant
because the city requires all applicants to have their qualifi-
cations approved by a private employment agency, and that
agency refuses, for discriminatory reasons, to approve the
qualifications of the black applicant. 46
(5) A black seeking private employment through a city
employment service is rejected by private employers because
his test scores have been lowered by racist city officials. 47
Although the person acting with the discriminatory motive
and the person actually rejecting the applicant are not the
same, each of these transactions involves intentional racial
discrimination that clearly injures the victim. The involve-
ment of several distinct actors is not unique to equal protection
violations; in other areas of constitutional law, it is frequently
necessary to direct remedial orders against officials other than
those who initiated the constitutional violation. 48
43 See cases cited supra note 5.
44 Judge Sobeloff discussed the danger of such use of tests in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1241 (4th Cir. 1970) (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), rev'd, 401 U.S. 424 (I97i).
45 See, e.g., Fisher v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 527, 545-46 (5th
Cir. 198o) (discussing "total assessment" standard for grading workers' job perfor-
mance, under which all applicants for promotion must be rated by supervisory per-
sonnel).
46 See, e.g., General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 102 S. Ct. 3141
(1982) (builders hired only workers referred by union).
47 See Pegues v. Mississippi State Employment Serv., 57 F.R.D. 102, IO3 (N.D.
Miss. 1972).
4s Although a writ of habeas corpus is directed to the governmental official charged
with custody of the petitioner, in the majority of cases the party responsible for the
constitutional violation is not that official, but a judge, prosecutor, or police officer
whose actions, possibly years earlier, led to the petitioner's conviction. See Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485-86 (1973). In such cases, the action of the official in
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If the two actions in the examples suggested above occur
almost simultaneously, what is in fact a two-part transaction
is described simply as "discrimination." There is no practical
reason, however, why an act of intentional discrimination and
the later conduct that brings that act to bear on its victim
cannot be separated by weeks, months, or even years. For
example, a low rating given a black applicant by a biased
interviewer could continue to be used for a decade or longer
to reject that applicant. When a substantial temporal sepa-
ration exists, the entire occurrence is commonly characterized
as "perpetuation of past discrimination," and the later act is
described as "perpetuating the effect of past discrimination."' 49
But no rigid line, no constitutionally sanctioned time limita-
tion, distinguishes "discrimination" from "perpetuation of past
discrimination." The choice of terminology tells us only that
the commentator considers the passage of time involved to be
a long one. Perpetuation of past discrimination is simply dis-
crimination in slow motion.
The common causal assumption that a discriminatory mo-
tive will coincide in time with the action that it animates
derives in large measure from an unduly anthropomorphic
view of the way that governments function. In the case of an
individual, motive and action can be separated in time only
by the microseconds required for the impulse to act to be
transmitted from the brain to the relevant muscle. If a desire
to hurt blacks was not on an official's mind at the moment
that official signed a directive instituting a high school degree
requirement, hurting blacks simply cannot be described as his
goal.
A government, however, does not have a single mind and
arm; both its decisionmaking process and its capacity for action
are distributed in a complex manner among large numbers of
employees who control and influence one another's behavior
in complicated and often slow-moving ways. If a mayor, act-
ing for discriminatory reasons, directs a personnel officer to
institute a high school degree requirement and the officer does
so, we properly describe the requirement as a racially moti-
vated one. That characterization is correct even if the person-
nel officer acts months later and intends only to obey the
mayor, and the characterization remains appropriate regardless
whether, by the time the requirement is actually adopted, the
retaining the petitioner in custody perpetuates the effect of the constitutional violation
that invalidated the petitioner's conviction.
49 In the case of institutionalized discrimination, see infra -pp. 855-58, there is
frequently no such "perpetuating" subsequent act.
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mayor may have forgotten about it, may have undergone a
change of heart and joined the NAACP, or may have died.
In sum, vestiges of past discrimination do not exist gratui-
tously or only to a small degree - creating systematic, per-
vasive, and enduring vestiges is what effective discrimination
was and is all about. Like a terrorist pouring poison into a
city water system, an official who engages in racial discrimi-
nation intentionally sets in motion events that will cause harms
that he cannot predict to victims whom he will never know.
Because it is this evil that the fourteenth amendment was
designed to halt, the equal protection clause should be con-
strued to provide redress for present injuries caused by past
discrimination. The passage of time between the discrimina-
tory intent and the resulting harm is irrelevant both to the
purpose and to the effect of that discrimination and thus can-
not be permitted to limit the protection afforded by the Con-
stitution.5 0
Centuries of governmentally enforced and practiced racial
discrimination have brought about enduring harms to racial
minorities in ways that are beyond our capacity to trace in
detail. That official discrimination has also played a major
role in creating, nurturing, and legitimating the private acts
of discrimination that have contributed to the present plight
of the black community. These generalized connections be-
tween past official discrimination and present harms should be
central to discussions of social policy and should bear heavily
on assessing the wisdom, and perhaps the constitutionality, of
affirmative action.5 1 Such broad interrelationships may in the
final analysis be one of the most effective ways in which past
discrimination is perpetuated. The law, however, must pre-
scribe with some degree of precision when a particular harm
is sufficiently connected with the act of a specific individual
or institution to warrant affording a judicial remedy. Such
connections, as Part I explains, can occur in a variety of
ways.
so See Keyes v. School Dist. No. i, 413 U.S. 189, 210-Il (1973) ("If the actions
of school authorities were to any degree motivated by segregative intent and the
segregation resulting from those actions continues to exist, the fact of remoteness in
time certainly does not make those actions any less 'intentional.'").
51 See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 370-71 (1978)




I. THE VARIETIES OF CAUSAL PERPETUATION OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
A past act of racial discrimination may cause a present
injury in several distinct ways. First, the discrimination could
be "bifurcated," involving two or more separate acts by one
or more officials of the same governmental entity. Second, it
could be "bipartite," involving related actions of two or more
distinct parties. Finally, it could be "institutionalized," a sit-
uation that occurs when a single discriminatory act creates
physical or social circumstances that endure and cause injuries
in the future. The distinctions among these forms of perpet-
uation are critical to determining the appropriate remedy for
particular instances of causal perpetuation of past discrimina-
tion.
A. Bifurcated Discrimination
Bifurcated discrimination occurs when a government offi-
cial bases a present action directly or indirectly on a prior
discriminatory governmental decision. In its simplest form,
such discrimination transpires, for example, when official A
rejects a black job applicant because official B, acting out of
racial animus, had earlier given the applicant a low rating or
denied the applicant the job training needed for the work.
Most actual cases are considerably more complicated.
z. Prior Government Decisions. - An official action may
give new life to past government discrimination by attaching
some present significance to a past discriminatory decision.
The most infamous examples of such perpetuation are the
grandfather clauses enacted in the late nineteenth century,
which exempted from onerous voter registration requirements
descendents of men eligible to vote before the adoption of the
fifteenth amendment.5 2 In the wake of Washington v. Davis,5 3
one would not hesitate to assert that the manifestly discrimi-
natory purpose of these statutes rendered them unconstitu-
tional. In 19,5, however, when these laws came before the
Supreme Court in Guinn v. United States,5 4 a statute valid
52 The law overturned in Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), provided
an exemption from the state literacy test. The ordinance in Myers v. Anderson, 238
U.S. 368 (1915), contained an exemption from a requirement that a voter own $500
worth of property.
53 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
54 238 U.S. 347 (1915); see also Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 377 (1915)
(companion case assessing state law that exempted from requirement that voters own
$5oo worth of property citizens who, or citizens with ancestors who, were allowed to
vote before the adoption of the 15th amendment).
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on its face could not be attacked on the basis of the motives
of the legislators who had enacted it.55 The Supreme Court
nonetheless unanimously struck down the grandfather clauses
because the racial criteria in effect before the Civil War were
made "the controlling and dominant test of the right of suf-
frage" more than half a century later.56 Through a "revi-
talization"57 of the conditions that the fifteenth amendment
sought to eliminate, the grandfather clauses thus "re-create[d]
and reestablish[ed] a condition which the Amendment prohib-
its."S8
Discriminatory application of voter literacy tests raises
problems similar to those addressed in Guinn. Frequently,
southern registrars not only applied literacy requirements with
special strictness to black applicants, 59 but also permitted il-
literate whites to register despite their inability to pass the
tests. 60 A decision in 1968 to apply a literacy test only pro-
spectively would have exempted from that test the all-white
illiterate group that past registrars had exempted on the basis
of race. The Supreme Court has thus held that a state must
choose either to abandon such a test entirely or to order a
complete reregistration in which the test would apply equally
to all. 61 The Court reasoned that to continue to use the test
would subject blacks in the future to a standard that, for
discriminatory reasons, had not been applied to illiterate
whites in the past, and thus would "freeze the effect of past
discrimination in favor of unqualified white registrants. ' 62 In
so holding, the Court did not suggest that any present discrim-
inatory intent either existed or was a necessary basis of its
decision.
The principle recognized in Guinn is that the same legal
standard that applies to the division of authority among con-
temporaneous officials should also be applied to officials acting
at different times. A state should not be able to reduce its
constitutional obligations by fragmenting its decisionmaking
and restricting judicial scrutiny to the most recent government
s See Guinn, 238 U.S. at 36o.
56 Id. at 364-65.
57 Id. at 364.
58 Myers, 238 U.S. at 380.
59 See H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., ist Sess. 11-13 (1965); S. REP. No. 162,
89th Cong., ist Sess. pt. 3, at 4-5, 9-12 (1965).
60 See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 312 (1966); Louisiana
v. United States, 380 U.S. i45, 154-55 (1965).
61 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 333-34; Louisiana v. United States,
380 U.S. at 155.
62 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 334 (upholding under Civil Rights
Act an injunction against the use of a literacy test).
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act. If official A maintains a practice of hiring only applicants
approved by official B, who for discriminatory reasons ap-
proves only whites, the resulting rejection of a qualified black
by A would violate the equal protection clause. The division
of responsibility among several officials should not affect the
underlying constitutional obligations of the state that employs,
and acts through, all of them.
Any division of responsibility ordinarily involves at least
some separation in time; B's decision cannot control A's action
unless that decision precedes the action. If it is constitutionally
impermissible to base a present official action on a discrimi-
natory official decision that occurred a day before, only a
"peculiar necromancy" 63 could lead to the conclusion that it is
somehow permissible to ground the later action on a discrim-
inatory governmental decision that occurred a decade or a
century earlier. Indeed, the history and purpose of the four-
teenth amendment support the conclusion that reliance on de-
cisions made in the distant past, when discrimination was more
widespread and virulent, should be scrutinized even more
closely than conduct based on more recent events. When of-
ficial conduct is shaped by a constitutionally forbidden pur-
pose, it is irrelevant whether the person whose decision
embodied that purpose is present to witness its final imple-
mentation or lies in some long-forgotten grave.
The most common example of a past decision that is given
subsequent operative effect is the decision of a legislature to
adopt a particular statute. Officials implementing such a law
are simply giving present effect to a legislative decision made
in the past. It should be constitutionally irrelevant whether
the contemporary officials have no personal racial animus, are
unaware of the motives behind the statute, or mistakenly im-
plement an improperly motivated law when they should have
implemented a different, nondiscriminatory law.64
63 Guinn, 238 U.S. at 365.
64 Although it may today seem self-evident that the government cannot enforce a
statute adopted in the past for an impermissible purpose, it was only in I976 that the
Supreme Court applied this doctrine to past legislative decisions and thus effectively
overruled its decision of five years earlier in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217
(107); see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-48 (1976). Palmer upheld the
closing of certain municipal swimming pools, despite allegations that the decision to
close them was motivated by a desire to avoid integration. See Palmer, 403 U.S. at
219. The Court, in refusing to consider the city's motives, was troubled by uncertainty
concerning how far into the future a tainted 1963 decision would reach, see id. at
230 (Blackmun, J., concurring), and by the prospect that, although present officials
might be forbidden to close the pools on the basis of that 1963 decision, they could
nonetheless close the pools for different reasons. See 403 U.S. at 225. These problems
are inherent in any rule forbidding present application of some past decision because
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2. Consequences of Prior Government Actions. - (a) The
Principle of Liability. - The action of an official that attaches
additional consequences to circumstances created by past of-
ficial discrimination is equivalent to a decision by that official
to allocate burdens or benefits according to the discriminatory
preferences of earlier officials. Causal perpetuation of this
kind, however, raises issues not presented by action that relies
directly and expressly on the past decision as such.
Following the invalidation of the Oklahoma grandfather
clause, that state enacted an onerous requirement that every
voter eligible to register in 1916 do so within a twelve-day
period or be disenfranchised for life. 6 5 Those who had voted
in 1914 (when the grandfather clause was in effect) - most
whites - were exempted from this provision. Thus, the bur-
den of the 1916 law fell primarily on black citizens. In Lane
v. Wilson, the Supreme Court struck down the 1916 statute
because it "part[ook] too much of the infirmity of the 'grand-
father' clause to be able to survive."' 66 Rather than base its
decision on any current discriminatory purpose, the Court con-
demned the law because its inevitable result was to perpetuate
the consequences of an earlier unlawful discriminatory act.
Even though the statute was facially neutral, "the opportunity
. . . given negro voters to free themselves from the effects of
discrimination to which they should never have been subjected
was too cabined and confined."' 67 Lane thus recognized that
action that perpetuates the consequences of a past discrimi-
natory decision suffers from the same constitutional infirmity
as action, such as that in Guinn, that simply perpetuates the
past discriminatory decision itself.
A present practice that is closely analogous to the grand-
father clauses condemned in Lane - and that at times should
be equally condemned - is the use of seniority to determine
the conditions of employment for public employees. Unlike a
policy based on actual skill or relevant experience, a seniority
system bases the terms and conditions of employment at least
partly on whether the government was willing to hire an in-
dividual or members of a particular group at some earlier
time. 68 At least in the case of workers denied employment at
of the motives underlying that decision. Washington v. Davis makes clear that these
difficulties are not sufficient to justify giving present effect to past discriminatory
decisions.
65 Act of Feb. 26, 1916, ch. 24, § 4, i9x6 Okla. Sess. Laws, quoted in Lane v.
Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 27o n.i (I939).
66 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939).
67 Id. at 276.
68 Although the seniority systems that private employers use have a similar impact,
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that earlier time, 69 the motives and practices of, for example,
1963 personnel officers are made the "controlling and dominant
test" of how employees are treated in 1983. If only individuals
hired during an era of discrimination are eligible for higher
salaried positions, the seniority system "re-creates and reestab-
lishes" the earlier racial criterion for filling those desirable
positions. 70
Another example of bifurcated discrimination of this type
is the use of literacy tests by a state that earlier had denied
blacks the educational opportunities that would have enabled
many of them to pass the tests. In such a case, the conse-
quences of past discrimination in education determine who
may vote; control of registration is thus placed in the hands
of past education officials rather than in those of present elec-
tion officials. The Supreme Court has recognized that, if a
state had "systematically deprived its black citizens of the
educational opportunities it granted to its white citizens," "'im-
partial' administration of the literacy test today would serve
only to perpetuate those inequities in a different form."' 71 The
Court has repeatedly held that the perpetuation of discrimi-
nation in this manner provides a basis under the fifteenth
amendment for a congressional ban on such literacy tests;72 in
addition, the four Justices who have reached the constitutional
issue agree that such perpetuation violates the fourteenth or
such systems are subject to the requirements of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(h) (1976 & Supp. V i98I), rather than the more stringent
constitutional requirements. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324 (i977).
69 For discussion of the impact that eliminating this reliance on past racial criteria
has on past discrimination's white beneficiaries, see infra p. 847. United Air Lines
v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (I977), held that under title VII a private employer engaging
in racial discrimination may, after the brief peri6d for filing title VII charges has
ended, "treat the past act as lawful." Id. at 558. This holding is precisely the "ancient
history" argument spurned by the Court in Lane v. Wilson. See supra p. 843.
Whatever basis this much-debated interpretation of title VII may have in legislative
history, see The Supreme Court, r98i Term, 96 HARv. L. REv. 62, 286-88 (1982),
the interpretation embodies a doctrine that is anathema to the purpose of the i4 th
amendment.
70 The 1963 employment practices would have a similar impact on individuals
who were deterred from applying because of an employer's notorious policy of dis-
crimination or on individuals who were prevented from applying by a discriminatory
recruitment policy that, for example, notified only whites when vacancies arose. See,
e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 362-64 (1977).
71 Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 295-96 (1969); see also Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (stating that the use of a literacy test
in Gaston County served to "abridge the right to vote indirectly on account of race").




fifteenth amendment. 73 Similarly, in cases in which the liter-
acy test of one city perpetuates the effects of discrimination in
education by another city, that perpetuation is actionable if
both cities are located in, and are thus agencies of, the same
state. 74
These principles are particularly applicable in desegrega-
tion cases involving school systems that were never segregated
by law. A "neighborhood school policy" does not by itself
dictate which students will go to which schools. Under such
a policy, the assignment of students to particular schools is,
in effect, made by the officials who decide where "neighbor-
hood" schools will be built 75 and by zoning or other officials
who may exercise control over which families will live in which
neighborhoods. 76 If past school officials in a residentially seg-
regated city, acting for discriminatory reasons, located one
school in the center of an all-black neighborhood and another
in the center of an all-white neighborhood, a present "neigh-
borhood school policy" would as a practical matter be a policy
of letting past officials decide, on the basis of race, that white
and black students will attend separate schools. In a case of
officially induced residential segregation, a neighborhood
school policy delegates pupil placement decisions to past hous-
ing or zoning authorities. There is nothing unlawful about
delegating student assignment decisions to past officials or to
officials of other agencies, but if those decisions are or were
made on a discriminatory basis, 77 delegation of this kind vio-
lates the fourteenth amendment.
(b) Remedial Issues. - Equitable considerations that
would not arise in a case of reliance on a prior decision will
at times limit or shape the relief available in a case involving
73 See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 133 (opinion of Black, J.) (14th amendment);
id. at 232 (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (15th amendment).
74 Although the 14 th amendment prohibits only "states" from denying equal pro-
tection of the laws, cities and counties are both subject to the same prohibition because
they are regarded for i 4th amendment purposes as mere agencies of the state. See,
e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. i, 17 (1958).
75 See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 21 (197).
76 See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977) (upholding zoning decision allegedly based on intent to exclude
minorities).
77 A similar problem occurs when present jury commissioners use lists of prospec-
tive jurors prepared by predecessor officials who systematically excluded blacks. See,
e.g., Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698, 715-16 (5th Cir. 1966) ("The Commission
inherited a card index that for years had succeeded in producing only white jurors
on the grand jury and the petit jury in Orleans Parish. Its failure to change the
system amounted to a deliberate decision to continue the systematic limitation of
Negroes on the venires.").
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reliance on the consequences of past discrimination. The gov-
ernment may have given such consequences present controlling
effect because, however tainted their origin, they involve phys-
ical, social, or economic circumstances that are related to the
achievement of legitimate government policies. Thus, if a state
chooses or is compelled to frame its policies to ensure that
blacks are treated in the same way that they would have been
treated "but for" past discrimination, the present consequences
of that discrimination may harm, or impose costs on, parties
other than the original black victims. When, for example,
schools have been situated for racial reasons only in predom-
inantly black and white communities (rather than in racially
mixed areas), a neighborhood school policy that has the ben-
eficial effect of minimizing student travel time will also result
in segregated schools; integrating the schools will necessarily
involve transporting some students to more distant schools.
Ordinarily the imposition on the government of costs inci-
dent to avoiding perpetuation of past discrimination is not a
matter of concern; the burdens caused by unlawful conduct
properly belong on the wrongdoer rather than on the victim.
Thus, the fact that a school board will have to acquire, op-
erate, and maintain the buses needed to transport students
does not weigh against a busing remedy. It is not necessarily
undesirable if the harm that a remedy causes to the wrongdoers
exceeds that originally suffered by the victims; on the contrary,
the fear that the ultimate cost to the government will far
exceed any "benefits" accruing to whites from discrimination
would tend to deter that discrimination. Only when the cost
to the government of avoiding the perpetuation of the conse-
quences of its past discrimination is grossly disproportionate
to any harm suffered by the victims should a court shrink from
ordering that relief. 78
Courts must, however, consider the adverse impact on
innocent third parties that potential remedies might have.
Whenever feasible, the consequences of past discrimination
should be cancelled out in a way that places all of the burdens
on the original wrongdoer, but doing so will not always be
possible. An inability to place all remedial burdens on the
wrongdoer, however, should not preclude a remedy. Any
claim of innocent third parties to be free from harmful con-
sequences rooted in past discrimination is not superior to the
constitutional rights of equally innocent black victims. When
the burdens of past discrimination cannot be eliminated en-




tirely, they should be distributed as equitably as possible
among blacks and whites alike. Limiting a remedy is appro-
priate only when that remedy would inflict an injury on third
parties that substantially exceeds the harms suffered by the
black victims. In school desegregation cases, for example,
white children should share equally in the inconvenience of
any busing, but neither they nor black children should be
bused so far that their safety or the effectiveness of the edu-
cational process would be endangered. 79
In applying this limiting principle, however, claims that
the third parties involved are "innocent" must be carefully
scrutinized. Ordinarily discrimination is intended not merely
to harm blacks, but also to advantage whites. Neutralizing
the consequences of past discrimination will usually harm some
whites by eliminating that intended advantage. Rather than
being an undesirable side effect, eradicating such advantages
is the purpose of forbidding the perpetuation of past discrim-
ination. For example, when a racist personnel officer gives
jobs or promotions to white applicants instead of better qual-
ified blacks, the whites have no more right to keep the posi-
tions than they had to obtain them in the first place.8 0 Any
inconvenience the whites will suffer by reason of losing the
jobs to which they were never entitled will ordinarily be out-
weighed by the benefits that accrued while the jobs were
held.8 1 To the extent that such is not the case, any recompense
for the whites must come at the expense of the employer, not
at that of the black victims.
79 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. i, 30-31 (971).
SO In Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), Justice Powell,
dissenting in part, argued that white employees hired into positions from which blacks
were illegally excluded were "innocent" third parties and thus would be unfairly
penalized if blacks were given the seniority rights that the blacks would have enjoyed
had the employer obeyed the law. See id. at 781-99 (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). In Franks, a typical employment discrimination case of its
time, the employer (as of 1968) had hired 464 whites and not a single black for the
lucrative "over the road" driver positions that were the object of the litigation. See
Brief for Petitioners at 7, Franks (No. 74-728). The employer's explanation was that
its white drivers refused to work with blacks and would not share bunk facilities or
showers with them. Id. at 7-9. Few white employees could have been unaware that
the law was being violated. The equitable position of the white employees in Franks
is the moral equivalent of that of a fence who objects to returning stolen property on
the ground that he expected he would be able to keep it because the thief would not
be caught. The majority in Franks concluded that white employees had no legitimate
basis for objecting to seniority relief that merely restored the victims of discrimination
to the status the victims would have enjoyed had the law not been broken. See 424
U.S. at 774-77.
81 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 485 (i98o) (white contractors adversely




A somewhat different set of issues arises when a complex
discriminatory transaction involves the related actions of two
distinct parties. Cases in which present government conduct
is controlled by past private motives are familiar. In Shelley
v. Kraemer,8 2 for example, the Supreme Court reviewed the
decision of the Missouri courts to enjoin Mr. and Mrs. Shelley
from buying a house in violation of a thirty-seven-year-old
private restrictive covenant prohibiting sale of property to
blacks. In Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts
(Girard College),8 3 the Philadelphia city board operating a col-
lege excluded blacks in conformity with the 126-year-old will
of the school's benefactor, which directed that admission be
limited to orphaned whites. In Evans v. Newton,84 the city
of Macon, Georgia, was involved in the operation of a public
park that excluded blacks, as required by a fifty-five-year-old
will bequeathing the land for use as an all-white park.
Although all of these cases were held to involve state action
because public officials took steps that injured blacks, whether
the discrimination should be characterized as state action was,
and remains, a more difficult question.85 The Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that, when "the particular pattern of dis-
crimination, which the State has enforced, was defined initially
by the terms of a private agreement," that state enforcement
violates the fourteenth amendment.8 6 These decisions, how-
ever, were handed down before Washington v. Davis made
clear that discriminatory intent is an essential element in an
equal protection claim. Although it held that harm to blacks
must "reflect"87 or "be traced to a racially discriminatory pur-
pose" to violate the equal protection clause,88 Washington v.
Davis did not involve bipartite discrimination and therefore
did not indicate whether the discriminatory purpose must have
s334 U.S- 1 (1948).
353 U.S. 230 (1957).
84 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
85 See Crooks, The Racial Covenant Cases, 37 GEO. L.J. 514 (1949); Haber, Notes
on the Limits of Shelley v. Kraemer, x8 RUTGERS L. REV. 8I1 (1964); Horowitz, The
Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL.
L. REv. 208 (I957); Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment: The
Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16 U. CHI. L. REv. 203 (1949); Saks & Rabkin, Racial
and Religious Discrimination in Housing: A Report of Legal Progress, 45 IOWA L.
REV. 488, 495-507 (196o); Comment, The Impact of Shelley v. Kraemer on the State
Action Concept, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 718 (1956); Note, Equal Protection and the Racial
Restrictive Covenant: A Re-evaluation, 30 IND. L.J. 366 (i955).
86 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20.
87 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239.
88 Id. at 240.
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existed in the mind of a public official, rather than in that of
the related private party. This recurring problem can be an-
alyzed as one of the several varieties of causal perpetuation of
past discrimination.
i. Prior Third-Party Decisions. - Shelley, Girard College,
and Evans v. Newton can best be understood as attempts to
delegate to private individuals control over the sort of sub-
stantive activity in which governments themselves often en-
gage for public purposes. Girard College and Evans v. Newton
involved educational and recreational facilities, both of which
governments regularly provide to the public. In each case,
public officials would ordinarily have decided who would enjoy
government services of the kind at issue. Instead, those
choices had been placed in the hands of long-dead, private
individuals who acted for reasons forbidden to the government
itself.
If Philadelphia permitted a contemporary private citizen
named Stephen Girard to veto the admission of every black
applicant to a city-operated school, the discriminatory conduct
would unquestionably be unconstitutional.8 9 It is the exercise
of effective control over state conduct, not inclusion on the
public payroll, that makes such a veto state action. The case
is not different merely because the Stephen Girard to whom
authority was actually delegated was a dead man who com-
municated his decisions by a last will and testament, rather
than a living man who conveys his choices over the telephone.
Similarly, the city of Macon could no more permit a deceased
Senator Bacon to decide on a discriminatory basis who could
use a city park than it could authorize a live Senator Bacon
to do so. Such an individual is, even if unaware of it, clothed
with the authority of the state, and his or her conduct is as
much state action as is that of a mayor. To ascertain the
motive behind state action, it is not sufficient to investigate
only the salaried official who, possibly acting in a purely min-
isterial or even clerical capacity, inflicts the actual harm; one
must look as well to the individual who exercises effective
control over the nature of that action, regardless whether that
individual is on the state payroll or is still alive.
In Shelley what appeared to be a mere agreement between
the Kraemers and the prospective seller was in fact an effort
to establish a system of private land use zoning. The restric-
89 See Meredith v. Fair, 298 F.2d 696, 701-02 (5th Cir. 1962) (public college's
requirement that applicants provide a letter of recommendation from alumni, all of
whom were white and unlikely to recommend a black, held unconstitutional); Bell v.
Georgia Dental Ass'n, 231 F. Supp. 299 (N.D. Ga. 1964) (conduct of private orga-
nization in nominating members of state agency constituted state action).
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tive covenant in Shelley did more than limit the ability of the
white homeowners to sell their house to a black;90 if enforced,
it would effectively have forbidden all blacks from buying that
house. Covenants running with the land are analogous to
government land use controls, and sometimes resemble such
controls in their substantive requirements. Government au-
thorities traditionally regulate how land is to be used, who may
own it, and even who may live in a house. 91 By enforcing
covenants that impose comparable controls, the government
places the zoning power in the hands of private parties rather
than in those of public officials. 92
It is not unconstitutional perpetuation, however, for the
state to assist in enforcing traditionally private decisions. For
example, the police could evict the Shelleys if they showed up
uninvited to a dinner party held by the Kraemers. In deciding
whom to invite, the Kraemers would not be engaging in a
form of regulation analogous to normal governmental activity.
Governments do not ordinarily control decisions concerning
who associates with whom, regardless of the reasons - racial
or otherwise - that underlie these private decisions. In en-
forcing the Kraemers' decision, the government would merely
be protecting private activity and discretion traditionally free
from intrusion by either the government or other individuals.
2. Consequences of Prior Third-Party Action. - Govern-
mental conduct that perpetuates the effects of past private
discriminatory acts presents a problem very different from the
government's perpetuation of past private decisions as such.
As is true of the perpetuation of past private decisions, the
governmental action perpetuating the consequences of past
private decisions is shaped by a discriminatory purpose. But
removing that discriminatory taint is more difficult when such
consequences are involved. A city that perpetuates past pri-
vate decisions by basing its hiring of bus drivers on the recom-
mendations of a discriminatory private agency can end the
constitutional violation involved simply by making its own
employment decisions. But if the city needs trained drivers,
and the only training school has a history of excluding blacks,
90 When a contract between two private individuals that controls only those two
individuals limits conduct by one that would ordinarily be constitutionally protected,
enforcement is not necessarily invalid: the privilege of exercising constitutional rights
may, at least under some circumstances, be bargained away in return for other
considerations. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 5o9 n.3, 513 n.8
(I980) (per curiam).
91 See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. i (1974); Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
92 Cf. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 51 U.S.L.W. 4025, 4027 (U.S. Dec. 13,
1982) (delegation to church of power akin to zoning violates first amendment).
[Vol. 96:828
PERPETUATION OF DISCRIMINATION
the consequence of the private discrimination may be that
there are no trained blacks to hire. Only by itself assuming
the costs of training bus drivers can the city avoid perpetuating
the effects of the training school's discrimination. Imposing
such costs on the city would obviously be appropriate if the
city were responsible for the earlier discrimination in training,
but in this example the city is by definition an innocent third
party.
The government's status as an innocent party does not
mean, however, that a city or state is free in all cases to
perpetuate the consequences of past private discrimination.
The perpetuation of such consequences remains a constitu-
tional violation; a government's status as an "innocent" party
does not legalize its conduct, but merely provides an equitable
limitation on the available remedy. In a case of bifurcated
discrimination, the past invidious intent of the government
warrants imposition of any remedy whose cost is not grossly
disproportionate; here, however, the government's innocence
means that its interests are entitled to no less, but no more,
consideration than are the interests of the individuals who are
suffering from the effects of that earlier discrimination.
The problems that arise in this area do not lend themselves
to a simple rule, but instead require an ad hoc balancing in
which a state's asserted interests as well as the costs and
feasibility of alternative methods are carefully scrutinized.
Thus, the interests of the black victims in being free from the
consequences of such past discrimination must be weighed
against several factors: (i) the extent that abandonment of the
perpetuating practice would prevent, or increase the cost of,
the achievement of the government policy involved; (2) the
importance of that underlying policy; and (3) the interests of
any other genuinely innocent parties that might be affected by
abandonment of the perpetuating practice.
Bipartite perpetuation of this kind occurs when jury com-
missioners select grand or petit jurors from among their per-
sonal friends. If those commissioners, acting in their private
capacities, had long chosen to socialize only with whites, such
a personal acquaintance "test" would perpetuate the effects of
their earlier, private, racial decisions. Although maintaining
the competence and integrity of grand juries is a legitimate
state concern and might be fostered by this personal acquaint-
ance standard, the burden imposed upon that concern by re-
quiring jury commissioners to take affirmative steps to meet
and learn the qualifications of blacks is trivial. Accordingly,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a list compiled
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from a commissioner's all-white circle of friends cannot be used
as the basis f6r selecting grand jurors. 93
Imposition of voter literacy tests on blacks educated outside
the state requiring the test also poses a problem of bipartite
discrimination. 94 A state may have some interest in ensuring
that voters are well informed. But because a large number of
voters obtain most of their information about current events
from radio and television, literacy will often add little to a
voter's actual knowledge. Illiterate but politically concerned
citizens may well know more about the issues of the day than
do apathetic college graduates. Blacks disenfranchised by the
combination of a literacy test and past discrimination in edu-
cation would lose not only the right to vote, but also the ability
to protect other interests through the political process. 95 The
substantial harm imposed by literacy tests in such circum-
stances would clearly outweigh any marginal good that the
tests might achieve.
If a city needs to hire a lathe operator for a few weeks and
all available lathe operators are white because, unbeknownst
to the city, the union that runs the necessary two-year training
program excludes blacks, the city may constitutionally be per-
mitted to hire from that all-white labor pool. If the city is
filling a full-time permanent position, however, and only two
weeks of training are necessary to run the machine, the Con-
stitution requires the city to train blacks. As the cost and
delay required to train lathe operators decreases and the im-
portance of the jobs to black applicants increases, the obliga-
tions of the city change. No precise line can be drawn, how-
ever, to determine the number of days of training that are so
few that the city must provide them.
This balancing process is unnecessary when a state can
remove the taint from government practices affected by private
discrimination by preventing that discrimination in the first
93 See Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 289 (1950) (commissioners in their official
capacities had a "duty to familiarize themselves with the qualifications of the eligible
jurors of the county without regard to race or color"); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400,
404 (1942) (use of such a list violates a duty "not to pursue a course of conduct ...
which would operate to discriminate in the selection of jurors on racial grounds");
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 (1940) (same).
94 See Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 293 n.9 (1969) ("It would
seem a matter of no legal significance that they may have been educated in other
countries or States also maintaining segregated and unequal school systems."); see also
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 233-34 (1970) (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same).
95 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (political
franchise is fundamental right because it is "'preservative of all rights"') (quoting Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
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place. In some situations, such as those in which potential
voters are the victims of educational discrimination in another
state, this simple remedy will not be feasible. In the case of
the lathe operators, on the other hand, forbidding third-party
discrimination is clearly possible. When prevention of certain
private discrimination can eliminate the discriminatory impact
of state practices, this solution will ordinarily be virtually cost
free and should thus be constitutionally required. Although a
state may have no duty to forbid private discrimination, it
cannot ask a court to limit a remedy in order to avoid costs
caused by the state's own inaction. Therefore, if a state knew
or should have known that its actions were being controlled
by the effects of private discrimination, it cannot complain of
remedial burdens that would not exist if it had acted to pro-
hibit that discrimination. 96
3. Private Perpetuation of Prior Government Discrimina-
tion. - Just as a past private intent may control a present
governmental act, so too past official discrimination can shape
present private actions. Such effects can occur in several ways:
(i) Private reliance on a government decision. For exam-
ple, an employer refuses to hire an applicant, because the
applicant was not referred by the state employment service,
that referral having been denied on account of race.
(2) Private reliance on the consequences of government dis-
crimination. For example, an employer refuses to hire an
applicant, because that applicant lacks certain training or ed-
96 The circumstances under which the Constitution forbids state reliance on the
consequences of third-party discrimination are not the same as those under which
that third party itself would face liability because of the state's reliance. When the
third party acts solely for its own purposes and violates no law by doing so, that
party cannot be held liable merely because a state chooses to rely on the party's
conduct. On the other hand, when a private party acts partly or wholly in the hope
that the state will so rely, or when the party, having acted for other reasons, subse-
quently seeks that reliance, the overall transaction becomes joint activity; such a
relationship renders the party's conduct state action and results in liability for damages
caused by the state reliance. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 102 S. Ct.
2744, 2756-57 (1982); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150-52 (97o)
(merchant and police acted in concert to refuse admission of blacks to lunchroom);
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) (police and private citizens assaulted
blacks after release from custody). Such joint activity would occur, for example, if a
union refused to train blacks in order to prevent a city from hiring minority lathe
operators. This theory may mean that a third party will at times be financially liable
even though the state itself is not. When the third party's conduct is itself unlawful
for reasons unrelated to the subsequent state reliance, that party's financial liability
includes any foreseeable state reliance regardless whether the reliance was sought or
desired. Of course, if the present private conduct is coerced or required by the
government, the "private conduct" is state action.
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ucation, that training or education having been denied to black
students by the public schools on account of race.
(3) Government action that increases the risk of injury by
a third party. For example, a city bus driver ejects a black
passenger in the middle of a highway at night, because that
passenger refuses to sit in the rear of the bus; as a result, the
passenger is run down by a car.
In each of these cases, a private party inflicts the actual
injury. Although unconstitutional state action clearly oc-
curred, it ended before the actual infliction of the harm.
If the victim in such a case brings an action against the
government, the existence of a constitutional violation is clear;
the critical issue is which of the resulting injuries will be
redressed. 97 In light of the common law background against
which the fourteenth amendment was fashioned, 98 the mini-
mum area of liability and remedy for a discriminatory act
causing harm in this manner should be no less than would
exist for any other intentional tort. At a minimum, it is clear
that relief must be provided for any foreseeable injury99 and
that only the type of harm that might occur, not the precise
manner of occurrence, must have been foreseeable. 100
These rules of foreseeability and proximate causation also
apply to the previously discussed types of bipartite discrimi-
nation. In those cases, however, a governmental act causes
the actual injuries and is itself a discrete constitutional viola-
tion; foreseeability is thus measured from the time and place
of this later act and rarely limits the available relief. But
when liability is imposed because of private action perpetuat-
ing prior government discrimination, the government's action
by definition ended with its prior act, and it is from this
vantage point that foreseeability must be assessed.101
97 Cf. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967) (common law background of Civil
Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981)).
98 The question of which resulting injuries could be redressed is, at least on
occasion, one of constitutional magnitude. If Congress had the power to deny all
remedies for harms occurring in this way, it could effectively immunize, and thus
encourage, the discrimination involved.
99 See Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 475 (1877).
100 See F. WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF NEGLIGENCE § 74 (x874). It
is for Congress, in prescribing statutory remedies, to decide in which other circum-
stances a state might incur liability for harms caused by a combination of its discrim-
ination and some later private action.
101 The difference between foreseeability at the time of government action and
that at the time of private action may occasionally be of substantial importance. The
alteration of a black worker's test scores by a state official, for example, could affect
whether the worker is assigned to a well-paying white-collar position or to a less
lucrative blue-collar job. The resulting loss in wages would be foreseeable at the time
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The nature of discrimination and the policies and problems
discussed in Part I dictate that each new harm caused by
private conduct based on past government action be deemed
to create a separate cause of action against the government.
In an ordinary tort case, the statute of limitations 10 2 does not
begin to run until the tortious conduct has actually injured the
plaintiff, and if (as will usually be true when discrimination is
involved) the violation has been intentionally concealed, the
statute does not begin to run until the victim knows, or should
know, that the violation has occurred. 10 3 Frequently these
rules alone will suffice to toll the relevant statute of limitations.
But because the purpose of discrimination is to create future,
perpetuated injuries, limitations principles must be adapted to
ensure the failure of, and thus to deter, such unlawful activ-
ity. 104
C. Institutionalized Discrimination
A past governmental act can affect the present even in the
absence of a present act that activates or amplifies that past
act or its results. The physical, social, and economic conse-
quences of governmental discrimination may endure and con-
tinue to affect the same or new victims without any intervening
governmental or third-party action. If, for example, a city
builds well-lit, paved roads in its white neighborhoods but
leaves streets in black areas unpaved and unlit, these physical
differences will persist and continue to harm the members of
minority communities indefinitely. 10 5 A similar ongoing injury
will likewise occur solely because of continuing physical cir-
cumstances if the city builds its only hospital in the center of
a white neighborhood and thus imposes great inconvenience
of the alteration and thus should be actionable regardless whether a city agency or a
private employer relied on the test scores. A different result might follow if, after the
test score alteration, the shop in which those with lower scores came to work were
discovered to have a carcinogenic asbestos ceiling; some conditions may affect workers
in unpredictable ways unrelated to their salaries or the nature of their work. Any
claim of unforeseeability must be considered in light of the likelihood that particular
discriminatory actions were selected precisely because of their great capacity for harm.
102 In an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V i98i), the applicable limitations
period would ordinarily be drawn from state law. See id. § 1988.
103 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4 th ed. 1971).
104 See supra pp. 834-36.
105 See, e.g., Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1289-91 (5 th Cir. 1971)
(holding discrimination in street paving, lights, sewers, drainage, water mains, fire
hydrants, and traffic control signs to violate equal protection), affd per curiam on
reh'g en banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (5 th Cir. 1972).
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on routine patients and greater risk on emergency patients
from predominantly black areas.' 0 6
These cases of institutionalized discrimination differ from
bifurcated and most bipartite discrimination 10 7 because the
harm continues to be inflicted after, 10 8 often long after, all
government activity has ceased. The Supreme Court never-
theless has consistently recognized an affirmative obligation on
the part of the government to "dismantle" or "disestablish" 0 9
the tainted realities for which it is responsible. These realities,
like a hole maliciously dug in a road or a spring gun," 0 are
"perennial violations""' continually working new harms and
injuring new victims. As with the third category of bipartite
discrimination, the government is liable for any foreseeable
injuries, whether immediate or delayed, caused in this way by
unconstitutional discrimination.
The most familiar and important decisions in this area of
the law concern the disestablishment of segregated school sys-
tems. Although Brown v. Board of Education1 2 decided only
that black students could not be assigned to separate schools
on the basis of race, Green v. County School Board (New Kent
County)" 3 held that a school system formerly segregated de
jure could not satisfy its constitutional obligations merely by
permitting black and white children to attend the schools of
their choice. Such a school system was required instead to
reassign students on the basis of race in order to create racially
neutral attendance patterns. As Justice Rehnquist later ob-
106 Cf. NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, 491 F. Supp. 290 (D. Del. x98o)
(holding unconstitutional the moving of a hospital from heavily black inner city to
predominantly white suburbs), affd en bane, 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. ig8i).
107 In the third category of bipartite discrimination, in which subsequent private
conduct perpetuates the effect of past governmental action, the government action
may also have ended long before the infliction of any injury. See supra pp. 853-56.
10s A subsequent governmental action could, of course, preserve the conditions
created by the past discrimination or enhance their capacity to injure the victim
group. When government actions would prevent fashioning an effective remedy for
the institutionalized discrimination, the courts should prohibit such actions. See
United States v. Scotland Neck Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972) (division of school
district into two districts impermissibly impedes complete desegregation); Wright v.
Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972) (same).
109 See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-40 (1968).
110 See i F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS 252 (1956). A spring gun is a
rifle or pistol that has a trip wire attached to the trigger and that is aimed at the
location at which an intruder is likely to be standing when he or she touches the trip
wire.
111 Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 74 (19i1) (conditions created
by antitrust violation).
.. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
113 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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served, Green represented .a major though far from self-evident
gloss on Brown. 114
The result in Green follows from the fact that systematic
de jure segregation involves two distinct harms. The assign-
ment of a single black child on the basis of race to a particular
school is ordinarily a constitutional violation;" 5 in addition,
the fear and hatred generated by past segregation may deter
such a student from later transferring to a more convenient
integrated school even if given the chance." 6 The assignment
of large numbers of black students to a particular school works
still another wrong: it labels that institution as a "'Negro'
school"" 7 in the eyes of its students and of the community.
Even if a student newly arrived in New Kent County were
assigned to such a school without regard to race, that student's
rights would still have been violated. Like a physical sign
affixed to the school building reading "Negro School," this
officially sponsored racial identification is a constitutionally
impermissible badge of inferiority."18 That label, having once
been placed on the school and its black students by systematic
de jure segregation, can be removed only by altering the com-
position of the student body. When isolated acts of discrimi-
nation have assigned some students on the basis of race, it is
a sufficient remedy merely to reassign the affected students
and thus to undo the "incremental segregative effect" 119 of the
violation. When open, notorious, and widespread practices of
racial assignment result in racial identification, however, there
exists a distinct violation requiring its own remedy.
114 Keyes v. School Dist. No. i, 413 U.S. 189, 257-58 (i973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
I's The assignment of students on the basis of race would ordinarily be unconsti-
tutional, except when done to remedy a past violation or to promote integration. See
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22-31 (197i); cf. Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (i98o) (minority "set aside" program constitutional as a
method of avoiding the perpetuation of past discrimination).
116 Green, 391 U.S. at 44o n.5.
117 Id. at 442. As the Court elaborated in Green:
Racial identification of the system's schools was complete, extending not just
to the composition of the student bodies at the two schools but to every facet
of school operations - faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities
and facilities. In short, the State, acting through the local school board and
school officials, organized and operated a dual system, part "white" and part
"Negro."
Id. at 435.
1is See Brest, supra note 6, at 33-36 (explaining Green on other grounds, but
using similar reasoning to account for the decision three years later in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. (197)).
119 Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (i977). The retention
of students in the schools to which they were originally assigned on the basis of race
would be a case of bifurcated discrimination. See supra pp. 840-47.
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When governmental discrimination creates continuing so-
cial or physical conditions, each injury caused by those con-
ditions is a fresh constitutional violation. The appropriate
remedy in such cases is not merely to redress specific injuries,
but also to disestablish whatever ongoing state of affairs pro-
duced those injuries and threatens future harms. The appli-
cable remedial principles are the same as they are for bifur-
cated discrimination involving reliance on the consequences of
past discrimination.' 20 The cost that the remedy imposes on
the government will ordinarily be of no concern, because the
government itself is by definition the original wrongdoer. In
shaping remedies, however, consideration should be given to
the interests of any genuinely innocent third parties 12' who
may be affected, although taking account of their interests
should not result in leaving or placing them in a position
superior to that of any black victims.
II. ADMINISTERING THE SUGGESTED STANDARDS
All claims of unconstitutional discrimination require find-
ings of both a discriminatory purpose and a causal connection
between the discriminatory action and the alleged injury. 122
When a discriminatory transaction occurs over an extended
period of time and may be described as perpetuation of past
discrimination, the process of detecting the discriminatory pur-
pose and the causal connection may well be affected.
Washington v. Davis requires an inquiry into the purpose
behind the governmental decision - whatever its age - al-
leged to be unconstitutional. The difficulty of ascertaining the
motives behind a decision does not depend on the manner in
which that decision allegedly caused the present injury.' 23
Whether, for example, a grandfather clause disenfranchises
blacks relatively directly, as in Guinn, or more indirectly, as
in Lane, the task of detecting its purpose is the same. The
resolution of perpetuation claims may require determining the
motivation behind a larger number of past acts, but only
behind past acts that are similar to those presented by ordinary
discrimination cases.
The chain of causation connecting the original discrimina-
tory purpose with the alleged injury is of particular concern
120 See supra pp. 843-47.
121 See supra pp. 846-47.
122 See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617-18 (1973).
123 See Schnapper, Two Categories of Discriminatory Intent, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 31 (1982).
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in a perpetuation case. This relationship between purpose and
injury, however, is the same relationship that courts frequently
analyze - prospectively rather than retrospectively - to de-
termine in conventional discrimination cases the remedy ap-
propriate to correct the initial act of discrimination. 124 In
instances of discriminatory applications of literacy tests, for
example, the underlying lawsuits were aimed at that unequal
application, and the bar to further use of the tests was ordered
as a prospective remedy to prevent further harm. The problem
of ascertaining prospectively why more blacks than whites
would be disenfranchised by even a "fair" future application
of the tests is precisely the problem that would arise retro-
spectively if, after a cessation of that discrimination, a plaintiff
sued to invalidate a present "fair" use of the tests on the
ground that such use perpetuated past discrimination. Often
it will be easier to conclude with a reasonable degree of cer-
tainty that a harm that actually occurred resulted from a
particular past violation than it is to show that a harm that
may occur in the future will be the result of a present or recent
violation.
The causation issue arising in perpetuation cases is whether
a present injury results from past discrimination or would have
occurred regardless of any such discrimination because of past
events of no constitutional significance. Claims of bifurcated
or bipartite perpetuation allegedly based on past decisions will
usually not be difficult to resolve, because the intervening
action causing the disputed condition will ordinarily identify
the earlier decision on which that action is predicated. Two
causation issues are raised by a claim that a present harm is
the result of institutionalized discrimination or of bifurcated or
bipartite perpetuation involving reliance on the consequences
of prior discrimination. The first question is whether the past
act of discrimination is capable of causing the type of harm
involved - whether, for example, the denial of an adequate
education in Gaston County v. United States125 could have
resulted in a level of literacy so low that the victims could not
pass a literacy test. The second question is whether it was
that past act, rather than some other cause, that resulted in
the harm 12 6 - whether, for example, applicants are illiterate
because of discrimination in education rather than because of
some disability that would have prevented them from learning
124 Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
12 395 U.S. 285 (1969); see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (97$);
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. H12 (1970).
126 Such a contention was in fact made by the plaintiff county in Gaston County.
See 395 U.S. at 288.
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to read even if they had been provided the same education
afforded to whites.
The second question in turn presents four types of issues:
(i) Is there some circumstance other than the discriminatory
conduct that is capable of producing the disputed condition?
(For example, can an IQ of fifty cause illiteracy?)
(2) Did that circumstance actually exist at some point in
the past when it could have caused the condition? (For ex-
ample, did the applicant in fact have an IQ of fifty?)
(3) Did anything occur after the act of discrimination to
mitigate or eliminate its effects? (For example, was the appli-
cant given a remedial reading course?)
(4) What are the comparative probabilities that the discrim-
inatory act, as modified by any mitigating event, and the
neutral circumstance would produce the disputed condition?
These issues may occasionally present difficult evidentiary
questions, but such questions are not inherently unanswerable.
A lengthy delay between the act of discrimination and the
present condition increases the possibility of an alternative
cause' 27 or of some mitigating event; whether this delay will
matter in a given case, however, will depend on the particular
circumstances involved. The mere passage of years or even
decades will not necessarily frustrate this inquiry into the
causal relationship between the act of discrimination and the
injury; it is easier to determine that the lack of black registra-
tions in Lane resulted from the operation of the grandfather
clause twenty-five years earlier than it might be to decide
whether a delay in providing medical care to a black accident
victim caused his death an hour later.
Nothing about this factual inquiry is inherently different
from the issues that arise in deciding an ordinary tort case or
in fashioning a prospective remedy for a present act of dis-
crimination. Three considerations, all present in these other
types of cases as well, alleviate the problems involved. First,
the issue of causation must be decided not in the abstract, but
in a lawsuit; the question is not so much whether the discrim-
ination caused the present condition as whether the plaintiff
proved that it did so.1 28 Historians or sociologists might have
difficulty deciding whether discrimination in education caused
black illiteracy, but a judge need not know the answer to
decide a case. If the question were too speculative to answer
127 See W. PROSSER, supra note 103, § 43, at 252-53 & n.39.
128 Under certain circumstances, as in Gaston County, the burden of proof may
shift. At least in school desegregation cases, the plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case by proving the occurrence of a racially motivated action capable of causing the
injury alleged. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. i, 413 U.S. 189, 211 n.17 (1973).
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with a reasonable degree of certainty, an academic might find
himself or herself in a quandary, but a judge would simply
find for the defendant. 129 Second, a court can fashion remedies
that take account in an equitable way of any unavoidable
uncertainties. 130 Finally, in tracing the causal connection be-
tween an act of discrimination and a particular injury, judges
can draw both on their personal experience in resolving prob-
lems in other areas of the law and on the specific precepts that
have evolved over several centuries for dealing with analogous
problems in tort.
IV. CONCLUSION
Perpetuation of past discrimination may involve one or
more of three basic characteristics. It may be bifurcated, with
the injury following directly from a governmental act relying
on prior governmental discrimination, bipartite, with the in-
jury caused by a combination of governmental and third-party
action, or institutionalized, with the injury following some time
after any relevant governmental or third-party action. Not
every instance of perpetuation of past discrimination is uncon-
stitutional or entitles the injured party to a remedy; rather,
the defenses vary according to the type of perpetuation in-
volved, as is indicated by the table on the following page. 131
In a particular case, several instances of perpetuation, possibly
of different kinds, can occur consecutively or even concur-
rently. An injury to any black individual that occurs in this
manner violates his or her constitutional rights, regardless
whether the original act of discrimination, or any subsequent
perpetuating action, has an adverse impact on blacks as a
group. 132
129 A plaintiff should not be required to establish the absence of every conceivable
alternative cause. Although the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff,
evidence sufficient to create a reasonable inference that past discrimination caused the
present harm should shift the burden of proof to the defendant. See Mt. Healthy
City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284-87 (1977); Gaston County,
395 U.S. at 295-96.
130 In a Gaston County type of case, for example, rather than attempt either to
disenfranchise all whites who would not have passed the literacy test had they received
only the education that blacks received or to enfranchise all blacks who would have
passed the literacy test had they received a "white" education, the courts could simply
let everyone - black and white - vote.
131 Although almost never found, a compelling state interest is always a defense
to a discrimination charge.
132 If, in a city agency, a single black were assigned to a poorly paid position
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Equitable ForeseeabilityType of Perpetuation Limitation Limitation
Perpetuation of prior
government decision
Bifurcated Perpetuation of conse- Undue harm to
quences of prior gov- third parties or





Perpetuation of conse- Substantial ob-
quences of prior pri- struction of im-
Bipartite vate decision portant state in-
terests
Private perpetuation Perpetuation




Institution- act creates enduring Perpetuation
alized circumstances causing unforeseeable
subsequent harms
The constitutional requirement that courts "eliminate the
discriminatory effects of the past"'133 is simply the obligation
to prevent the perpetuation of past discrimination viewed from
a different point in time. The legal and causal relationships
between a 197o discriminatory act and a 198o injury are the
same regardless whether the relationships are examined by a
1975 court seeking to prevent that harm or a 1983 court un-
dertaking to remedy it. Perpetuation of past discrimination
remains an important and distinct area of law because of the
impossibility of foreseeing and preventing all future injuries at
because of his or her race, that assignment, and a seniority system that perpetuated
it, would violate the constitutional rights of that individual. Cf. Furnco Constr. Corp.
v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80 (1978) (affirmative action aiding certain blacks not
a defense to claim of discrimination against other blacks).
133 E.g., Green v. County School Bd., 39i U.S. 430, 438 n.4 (1968) (quoting
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)).
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the time of a given violation and because, as is true in the
case of bipartite discrimination, the initial act of discrimination
may not by itself be unconstitutional. Conversely, not all
continuing effects of past discrimination involve perpetuation.
If the victim of a past act of discrimination is left poor or
illiterate or physically impaired, much of the continuing suf-
fering will not be caused by some new act or continuing ex-
ternal circumstance1 34 that perpetuates the old violation. Such
injuries can be remedied only in an action to redress the
original constitutional violation. 135
The legal defense of perpetuation often involves a vigorous
effort both to deny the legal relevance of, and responsibility
for, the past discrimination that gives meaning and import to
a present practice and to insist that the harms befalling blacks
because of their race are "someone else's fault." In Lane v.
Wilson, 136 Oklahoma had disenfranchised for life anyone who
had failed to vote in i914 - a year in which blacks were
effectively forbidden to register - unless he or she had reg-
istered during a special twelve-day period in 1916. The state
sought unsuccessfully to defend this scheme by arguing that
the twelve-day registration period was adequate and by dis-
missing all of the events that preceded that period as "ancient
history."' 37 Today employers determine wages and jobs
through the use of seniority systems based on job assignments
made years earlier on the basis of race, but contend that those
original discriminatory assignments are too old to be action-
able. 138 Such perpetuation is an attempt to give controlling
present effect to earlier events while simultaneously insisting
that those past events are legally irrelevant.
The essence of effective racial discrimination was and re-
mains the creation of rules and circumstances that minimize
the necessity for new acts of intentional discrimination. Once
such a system has been established, all that is accomplished
by forbidding further intentional discrimination is interference
with the ability of biased officials to fine-tune the system and
adapt it to unforeseen developments.
134 See supra pp. 855-58.
135 See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 279-88 (1977) (remedial education
programs ordered for victims of school segregation).
136 307 U.S. 268 (i939).
137 Brief for Respondents at 67, Lane (No. 46o). Petitioners argued that the 12-
day registration period was a device to "perpetuate" the grandfather clause, which,
in turn, was said to be a device to perpetuate the legal conditions that preceded the
enactment of the I5 th amendment. Brief Supporting Petition for Writ of Certiorari
at 15-6, Lane (No. 460).




America's second reconstruction occurred only after a cen-
tury of discriminatory ingenuity had created circumstances and
set in motion social and economic forces that needed little
additional impetus to confine blacks to a subservient role.
Preventing new acts of intentional discrimination in the 196o's
could no more eliminate the burden of government-imposed
discrimination than forbidding the importation of slaves in
18o8 ended the practice of slavery. Indeed, other recent
changes have in many ways increased the effectiveness of the
old system of oppression that remains. Education and tech-
nical skills, important at the time of Brown, have become
essential to economic success and mobility; at the same time,
opportunities for well-paid and secure blue-collar jobs, the
route used by millions of whites to join the middle class, have
steadily declined. 13 9
Elimination of new acts of discrimination against blacks,
as against women and other groups, will remain an important
problem in the years ahead. But the central discrimination
issue of the i98o's will be to end the perpetuation of past
discrimination. If this goal is not accomplished, the speeches,
judicial decisions, and legislation of the past two decades may
merely continue the string of broken promises of racial justice.
The federal courts, which since Brown have repeatedly dem-
onstrated their determination to eliminate intentional discrim-
ination, must be equally vigilant and vigorous in ensuring that
the effects of that constitutionally condemned discrimination,
and the practices that perpetuate those effects, are also "elim-
inated root and branch."140
139 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES I98I, at 400 (Iq8i).
140 Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (I968).
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